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Climate governance through partnerships: A study of 150 urban 
initiatives in China 
 
Abstract   
Partnerships emerge as part of an environmental governance paradigm shift towards 
less hierarchical, more collaborative, and non-regulative steering arrangements. This 
paper examines the prevalence of partnerships in environmental governance on an 
urban level in a semi-authoritarian setting, by exploring climate initiatives in cities in 
China. The paper presents exploratory qualitative analysis of governance in urban 
China through analysis of a database of 150 climate initiatives in 15 cities, which are 
seen at the forefront of climate protection. The analysis suggests that climate 
partnerships are used as a governance strategy in China. Moreover, partnerships 
perform a range of essential governance functions, from rule-setting and provision of 
public infrastructure and services, to supporting technology development and low 
carbon demonstration projects. The results indicate that partnerships can facilitate local 
climate action by creating access to resources, such as information, technology, and 
funding, as well as contribute to introduction of emission reduction technology and new 
policy approaches. However, the inclusion of non-state actors in the formulation and 
delivery of climate mitigation projects redefines the lines of authority over public 
issues. This draws attention to two key governance challenges in the context of a 
comparatively state-controlled, top-down political system: skewed participation and 
lack of deliberative opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
These are tumultuous times in international climate change politics. The Trump 
administration has withdrawn the commitment of the United States to the carbon 
emission reduction agreement signed at the Paris Conference in 2015 (Hunt, 2017). 
Meanwhile, China is reinventing its position on this global issue ± from the nation that 
some described as ³ZUHFNing´WKH&RSHQKDJHQ&onference of Parties (COP) in 2009 
(Lynas, 2009), to a country donning the mantle of international climate mitigation 
leadership (Emmott & Bartunek, 2017; Hilton, 2016). While global political maneuvers 
continue, they no longer dominate the stage of global climate mitigation action. 
Policymakers and scholars have instead directed their attention towards the multiple 
responses produced by sub-national authorities, transnational organizations, private 
alliances and firms, grassroots movements, and individuals in their quests to address 
the climate change challenge (Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley et al., 2014).  
New possibilities for action have emerged since the turn to informal, experimental and 
voluntary approaches to climate change governance, and through the formation of 
networks of actors that operate across geographical scales and administrative borders 
(Bulkeley et al., 2014; Chan et al., 2015; Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; 
Okereke et al., 2009). Through transnational networks, sub-national government 
authorities and other non-state actors have gained prominent roles in climate action, 
and have created opportunities to shape international policy discourses and mobilize 
resources across political levels and boundaries (Kern & Bulkeley, 2009; Toly, 2008). 
Partnerships are a governance strategy associated with networks. Sustainability 
partnerships are ³FROODERUDWLYHDUUDQJHPHQWVLQZKLFKDFWRUVIURPWZRRUPRUHVSKHUHV
of society (state, market and civil society) are involved in a non-hierarchal process 
WKURXJKZKLFKWKHVHDFWRUVVWULYHIRUDVXVWDLQDELOLW\JRDO´*ODVEHUJHQS 
Sustainability governance through partnerships is a pervasive phenomenon (Backstrand 
et al., 2010; Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2012; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013; 
Glasbergen et al., 2007; Huijstee et al., 2007; Pattberg et al., 2012). Yet, there is a need 
to understand how governance through partnerships influences the delivery of sub-
national action for climate change. What kind of partnerships govern climate change? 
How, specifically, do partnerships contribute to local climate mitigation action?   
We examine this question in the context of climate mitigation action in China - a nation 
that has adopted ambitious low carbon development targets. China¶V Intended 
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) aim for carbon dioxide emissions to peak 
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by 2030, carbon dioxide emission intensity to be lowered by 60% to 65% from the level 
in 2005, and the share of non-fossil fuels in the energy mix to increase to 20% (NDRC, 
2015). These goals must to a large extent be implemented locally, especially on a 
municipal level. By &KLQD¶V urban population is expected to increase to around 
one billion, making up 70% of the national total (World Bank, 2014). Urban regions in 
China also account for a large share of energy use and energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions (Baeumler et al., 2012; Dhakal, 2011; Oshita et al., 2015). By introducing a 
low carbon pilot province and cities program (NDRC, 2013), the central government 
has placed municipal and provincial authorities at the forefront of experimentation in 
climate policy.  
At the same time, &KLQD¶Vnew environmental governance arrangements are shifting 
roles and responsibilities of public and non-state actors (Carter & Mol, 2013; Mol & 
Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009). Tangible changes include:  
1) Increasing responsibility of local authorities for environmental protection and 
climate mitigation (Lo & Tang, 2006; Qi et al., 2008); 
2) Increasing non-state actor participation in environmental policy (Francesch-
Huidobro et al., 2012; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro &, 2015; Meidan et al., 2009; 
Tsang & Kolk, 2010); 
3) Contribution of the private sector to sustainable infrastructure (Tian, 2015; 
Zhong et al., 2008); and 
4) Rising visibility of civil society in environmental affairs (Ho, 2007; Tang & 
Zhan, 2008; Zhan & Tang, 2013).  
Partnerships may be an important part of these transformations, but their role has not 
previously been studied in detail. Thus, this paper analyses how urban climate 
partnerships emerge at the local scale in China, how they facilitate local climate action, 
and what trends in participation they foster.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the literature on 
climate governance, with a focus on governance through partnerships. Section 3 
discusses trends in climate governance in China, highlighting the emergence of cross-
sector interaction and governance networks. Section 4 describes the methodology of 
the study. Section 5 presents the results, demonstrating a diversity of partnership 
constellations employed in urban climate governance. Section 6 discusses theoretical 
implications of the findings, in particular how parterships as a collaborative governance 
mode FDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQ&KLQD¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHP.  
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2. Climate governance through networks and partnerships 
The concept of governance gained traction as nation-states were deemed to lose 
influence over interconnected, fragmented and globalized public policy issues (Rhodes, 
1996; Rosenau, 1995). In this setting, governments sought to increase authority through 
sharing it horizontally (with non-governmental organizations) and vertically (which 
sub-national governmental or intergovernmental institutions) (Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 
Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000). Theories of governance networks provided 
workable alternatives to the failure of traditional hierarchal or market-based approaches 
to public issues in a dynamic and complex society (Kickert et al., 1997). This literature 
explains how public actors achieve collective goals through dialogue, negotiation, and 
collaboration with a diversity of inter-dependent organizations beyond the traditional 
public sphere (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012).  
In environmental politics, the rise of partnerships emerged as part of a governance 
paradigm based on less hierarchical and more collaborative, deliberative, and inclusive 
steering arrangements (Backstrand et al., 2010). An emphasis on deliberation has been 
central to environmental policy since at least the 1992 United Nations (UN) Conference 
on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) (Glasbergen, 2007), and this 
emphasis is reproduced in the Sustainable Development Goals (UNDSD, 2015). 
6'*³Revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development´) represents a 
firm commitment to partnerships as a strategy to implement sustainability action. 
Nevertheless, this conceptualization remains centered on traditional forms of 
governance based upon formal institutions and top-down control. A realization since 
the debacle in the 2009 Conference of Parties in Copenhagen (see Hoffman, 2011) is 
that partnerships create opportunities for performing agency and authority outside 
formal institutions. Glasbergen (2007) argues that governance through partnerships 
represents a fundamental shift towards pluralistic steering approaches where businesses 
and civil society not only are part of realizing predefined aims, but in formulating 
development goals. He argues that governance through partnerships is achieved 
through self-organizing capacities of societal actors and their collective commitment to 
resolving sustainability challenges. Sustainability partnerships exist in various forms, 
involving collaboration between companies, public authorities, NGOs, and research 
organizations, operating on a regional, national and global level (Huijstee et al., 2007). 
Sustainability partnerships also perform a variety of governance functions, ranging 
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from rule making and standard setting to information dissemination, technology 
transfer and capacity building (Pattberg et al., 2012).  
Climate mitigation presents new policy challenges and efforts to govern the climate 
often involve pursuit of material and policy innovation. Nation states have re-emerged 
as key actors in climate governance through a surge of activity directed towards 
developing novel climate policy instruments (Jordan & Huitema, 2014). Urban climate 
change governance is characterized by innovative measures and experimental 
processes, which open up new political spaces for intervention at the local level 
(Bulkeley & Castán Broto, 2012; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). Partnerships create 
opportunities for climate policy diffusion, as collaboration and cross-sector interaction 
can facilitate learning and adoption of new ideas and approaches (Bauer & Steurer, 
2014).  
The pursuit of collaborative and participatory forms of environmental governance 
generates a normative expectation that this will result in more democratic steering 
arrangements. Partnerships can accrue benefits such as consultation and dialogue, 
possibility to include otherwise marginalized voices, and filling participatory deficits 
(Glasbergen, 2011). For example, forming partnerships with communities can empower 
socially excluded groups and highlight issues of justice, while aligning agendas with 
local development priorities (Castán Broto et al., 2015a; Castán Broto et al., 2015b). 
However, such positive outcomes are not guaranteed (Backstrand et al., 2010). The 
transfer of influence over public issues to non-state actors can also be problematic from 
the perspective of democratic performance (Bogason & Musso, 2006; Pierre & Peters, 
2010; Sorensen, 2002). For partnerships to meet criteria of legitimacy and 
accountability, they depend on achieving transparency and equal access to participation 
(Backstrand, 2008; Benner et al., 2004). For example, partnerships resulting from the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) displayed higher participation of 
actors from the global North and traditional actors, such as international institutions 
(Andonova & Levy, 2003; Pattberg & Stripple, 2008; see also Bitzer et al., 2008; Clapp, 
1998; Dingwerth, 2008). In partnerships formed through transnational climate 
networks, government-led and private-private cpartnerships exhibit accountability 
deficits (Backstrand, 2008). Forsyth (2005) has argued that dominant players such as 
international institutions or large firms co-opt and exclude socially marginalized groups 
from partnerships. The benefits of partnerships can therefore not be taken for granted, 
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either in terms of effectiveness in climate change action or increasing the room for 
social deliberation and participation.  
 
3. Current trends in climate governance in China 
Mol and Carter (2006) argue WKDW&KLQD¶VHQYLURQPHQWDOVWDWHSUHYLRXVO\ characterized 
by state-centric approaches and top-down lines of control, is shifting towards new 
governance strategies that is part of a transition to D³PRGHUQHQYLURQPHQWDOVWDWH´This 
change is visible through a number of trends.  
First, &KLQD¶V central government encourages non-state actor involvement in 
environmental protection and climate change mitigation action in key policy 
documents. The recently revised Environmental Protection Law points to the 
importance of public participation by highlighting the role of society in monitoring 
environmental pollution, disseminating information, and taking legal action against 
environmental offendeUV13&&KLQD¶V National Climate Change Program aims 
WR ³ZLGHQ WKH FKDQQHOV´ IRU SXEOLF SDUWLFLSDWLRQ DQG HQFRXUDJHV HQWHUSULVHV WR
contribute to climate change mitigation (NDRC, IV, 2007). China¶V ,1'& calls for 
exploration of diversified paths of low carbon growth, which involves enhancing the 
responsibility of enterprises and introducing a stronger role for the public and media in 
supervising and participating in climate mitigation action (NDRC, p.15, 2015).  
Second, the central government is also creating new roles in environmental protection 
and climate mitigation for authorities at a provincial and municipal level. As part of a 
long-term process of decentralization, the central leadership has increased the political 
and economic autonomy of lower level government authorities (Cai & Treisman, 2007; 
Liu & Salzberg, 2012). Today, municipal governments shoulder a broad range of 
responsibilities, including the formulation of economic development strategies, 
provision of public services and infrastructure, and spatial planning (Saich, 2008). 
Local Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) have gained independence in 
determining priorities and financing arrangements, while being held to stricter 
performance standards (Lo & Tang, 2006). 6LQFHWKH1'5&¶VDGRSWLRQRID1DWLRQDO
Climate Change Programme in 2007, local governments are expected to set up climate 
change leadership groups and adopt climate action plans. Local impacts of climate 
change and rising knowledge of the issue at the same time contribute to engagement of 
municipal authorities in independent climate action (Qi et al., 2008). At the same time, 
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agendas (Li & Wang, 2012; Price et al., 2011). Decentralization involves a delicate 
balance between maintaining top-down control and making room for local interests. 
The degree of autonomy depends on how the central government chooses to exercise 
continued control, and on how local actors navigate the expanding room for maneuver 
(Chung, 2000; Chung, 2016; Tsui & Wang, 2008). 
7KHFRQFHSWRI³IUDJPHQWHGDXWKRULWDULDQLVP´GHVFUibes how bureaucratic units have 
gained influence over political decisions in China, resulting in negotiation and 
bargaining within the political system (Lieberthal, 1992). Dumbaugh and Martin (2011) 
observe that political power in contemporary China is diffuse, complex and 
competitive. A WKLUGNH\FKDQJHLQ&KLQD¶VHQYLURQPHQWDOJRYHUQDQFHLVDQLQFUHDVLQJ
involvement of non-public actors in environmental policy processes. Corporations (in 
particular large SOEs), parastatal think tanks and research organizations exercise 
significant influence over policy development (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012; 
Meidan et al., 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Wu, 2003). Although the central government 
limits social mobilization, environmental groups have become more visible and 
organized in recent years, increasing their capacity to influence political priorities (Ho, 
2007; Tang & Zhan, 2008; Zhan & Tang, 2013). Along with rising visibility and 
severity of environmental deterioration, concern with environmental issues pervades 
media, online forums, and public demonstrations (Duggan, 2013; Lo & Leung, 2000; 
Zhang, 2014).  
The operations of partnerships provide an insight into how climate change governance 
is accomplished. Until now, sustainability governance through partnerships has 
received limited attention in research on environmental issues in China; however, there 
is evidence that cross-sector collaboration and network formation play an important 
role in environmental protection and climate mitigation. For example, the central 
government sees Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a tool to diversify financing 
arrangements into sustainable infrastructure (Zhong et al., 2008; Xinhua, 2016). In the 
nongovernmental space, networks are forming between NGOs, media, lawyers, student 
groups, and researchers to advance shared goals (Lu, 2007). Chinese green NGOs are 
building connections with their foreign counterparts and increasing their participation 
in transnational networks (Schroeder, 2008). In a comprehensive study of the role of 
governance networks in urban climate mitigation, Mai and Francesch-Huidobro (2015) 
demonstrate that interaction among a plurality of state and non-state actors facilitates 
action by allowing knowledge transfers, resource mobilization, innovation diffusion, 
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policy mainstreaming, and awareness raising. They argue that the emergence of 
governance networks in urban sustainability efforts in China is a grossly overlooked 
topic, pointing to the need for further studies using this perspective (Mai and Francesch-
Huidobro, 2015, p.29). This paper presents the first systematic study of partnerships for 
climate change action in the Chinese city, to document broad changes in environmental 
governance and how they are changing the possibilities of action on the ground. 
 
4. Materials and methods 
This study draws inspiration from previous research using qualitative databases to study 
governance arrangements in transnational networks and sustainability partnerships 
(Pattberg et al., 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2012; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). The use 
of qualitative databases allows for exploration of activities that extend beyond single 
case studies, thus allowing systematic insights into governance patterns and trends 
(Pattberg, 2012). The approach involves compiling a large set of records containing 
information about a set of predefined dimensions. For this study, we created a database 
of 150 climate initiatives from fifteen cities in China.  
4.1 City selection 
We selected fifteen cities recognized for having a working program for climate action, 
and where cross-sector cooperation is likely to emerge. Such a sample represents the 
range of urban areas in China with an active engagement in climate issues, rather than 
all of urban China. Thus, governance patterns revealed by the analysis of this study do 
not necessarily reflect processes in cities where, despite having local environmental 
policies, climate action is not an explicit discourse informing local climate action. 
Nonetheless, the results may be indicative of emerging governance trends associated 
with the transition towards diversified environmental policy arrangements, which may 
eventually be expressed more widely across the country.  
To reflect upon broader changes in national policy, we selected twelve cities from 
&KLQD¶V Oow carbon pilot province and cities program. The NDRC launched this 
program in 2010 to support low carbon development solutions that may be up-scaled in 
other cities (NDRC, 2013). We selected seven cities from the first pilot batch (Baoding, 
Chongqing, Hangzhou, Guiyang, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Xiamen) and five cities from 
the second pilot batch, added to the program in 2012 (Beijing, Guangzhou, Kunming, 
Shanghai, and Qingdao). Finally, we included three cities not included in the pilot 
program, but which have obtained external recognition as forerunners in climate action 
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(Rizhao, Shenyang and Wuxi). Rizhao received UN-+$%,7$7¶V DZDUG IRU JUHHQ
planning in 2009 and the World Clean Energy Award for popularization of renewable 
energy sources in 2007. Wuxi is engaged in the international Low Carbon Future Cities 
(LCFC) project and is a center for clean-tech production. Shenyang is a member of 
ICLEI and has adopted a low carbon development plan.  
The selection of cities displays variation in socioeconomic conditions and geographical 
location (Table 1 and Figure 1). As illustrated by Table 1, the selection includes 
megacities, as well as smaller urban areas. The selection ranges from cities with high 
income (annual per capita of over 100,000 CNY) to medium income levels (annual per 
capita income of around 30,000 to 50,000 CNY).  
City  Province Population  
(2015 estimate, million)1 
GDP/capita 
 (2015, billion CNY)2 
Shanghai Shanghai 24 103 000 
Beijing Beijing 20 107 000 
Chongqing Chongqing 13 53 000 
Guangzhou Guangdong 12 138 000 
Shenzhen Guangdong 11 162 000 
Tianjin Tianjin 11 109 000 
Hangzhou Zhejiang 6 113 000  
Shenyang Liaoning 6 88 000 
Qingdao Shandong 5 103 000 
Xiamen Fujian 4 91 000 
Kunming Yunnan 4 60 000 
Wuxi Jiangsu 3 131 000 
Guiyang Guizhou 3 63 000 
Rizhao Shandong 1 58 000 
Baoding Hebei 1 30 000  
Table 1: List of cities selected for comparative analysis 
1
 (UNDESA, 2014) 
2 (China Online, 2017) China Online compiles data from national and local China Statistical Yearbooks 
and official news sources. 
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Figure 1: Geographical location of cities included in the study 
 
4.2  Selection of initiatives 
We defined a climate initiative as an action with an explicit goal of energy conservation, 
increased use of renewables, enhanced carbon sinks, or carbon fossil management, 
following the categories of climate action proposed by Socolow et al. (2004). An 
initiative was understood to represent a concrete action, or a set of actions, with 
evidence of implementation. For example, we did not include climate mitigation plans 
or sustainability agendas that specify broad development agendas or future intended 
action; however, we did include low carbon transport plans that involved a set of 
specific actions happening on the ground.  
We selected ten climate change mitigation initiatives from each city. The objective of 
focusing on an equal number in each city was to represent both geographical and 
sectoral variation in the sample while representing governance trends common across 
the cities. We were mindful of the risk of overrepresentation of cities where initiatives 
concentrate due to their role in international resource and governance networks. An 
initial search suggested that ten was an appropriate number of initiatives across the 
cities: all cities had at least ten initiatives that met the definition above, and this was a 
sufficiently big number to include initiatives from each sector in every city.  
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The search for initiatives for the database consisted of two steps. The first step was a 
systematic search of municipality websites, municipal or provincial news websites, 
websites of local companies, research organizations and civil society, and news and 
reports from international organizations and media, to identify the range of climate 
mitigation activities carried out in the selected cities. The second step was to select a 
sample of ten for inclusion in the database, focusing on prioritizing climate change and 
low carbon rationales, and meeting the criteria explained above. As we compiled the 
full selection, we revised the sample to ensure it represented initiatives led by diverse 
actors in each city and included a mixture of both typical (e.g. energy efficiency) and 
innovative projects (e.g. residential solar energy). 
4.3 Database design  
Each database record contains the following information: (1) year of launch; (2) sector; 
(3) type of organization leading the initiative; (4) cross-sector cooperation involved; (5) 
governance functions performed by the initiative, and (6) new technologies and policy 
or planning practices. The earliest project was launched in 1998 (a waste-to-energy 
plant in Hangzhou) and the latest in 2015 (a biomass power plant in Hangzhou and a 
low carbon park in Baoding). We selected initiatives from six sectors: industry, energy, 
construction, transport, land use (including forestry), and waste management. These are 
the sectors of climate interventions identified by the IPCC (2014), minus agriculture, 
as we did not find any initiatives in this sector. As illustrated by Table 2, the largest 
number of initiatives in the sample were carried out in the energy and industrial sectors, 
and the smallest number in the waste sector. The larger number of initiatives chosen 
from the energy, industry and land-use sectors reflects that projects concentrate in these 
policy domains)RUH[DPSOHWKHGLVWULEXWLRQFDSWXUHVHIIRUWVWRGHFDUERQL]H&KLQD¶V
energy supply and shift industrial activities towards low-carbon practices.  
Sector Number of initiatives 
Energy 35  
Industry 32  
Land Use 29  
Construction 24  
Transport 20  
Waste 10  
TOTAL 150  
Table 2: Sector of selected climate initiatives 
For each record, we listed the type of organization leading the initiative as follows: city 
authority, company, local academia/NGO, national or provincial authority, 
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international/foreign organization, and public-private partnership (PPP). Cross-sector 
cooperation reflected all actors cooperating with the leading actor. The most common 
actor leading initiatives was municipal authorities (Table 3). Companies included state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (58%), private companies (36%), and public-private firms 
(6%). The sample also included one university-led initiative, one initiative led by an 
organization listed as an NGO, and nine initiatives led by research institutes or think 
tanks. Foreign or international organizations included foreign firms, international 
institutions, foreign authorities, and bilateral partners.  
Actor type  Number of initiatives 
City authority 77  
Company 53  
Local Academia/NGO 11  
Foreign/International organization 5 
National or provincial authority 2  
PPP 2  
TOTAL 150 
Table 3: Actor type leading selected climate initiatives 
Following the literature on sustainability and climate partnerships we identified the 
following governance functions: agenda setting, advocacy, rule-making, standard 
setting, raising awareness, dissemination of information, knowledge production, 
implementation, service provision, capacity building, technology transfers, and 
developing sustainable products (Andonova et al., 2009; Bulkeley et al., 2012; 
Glasbergen, 2007; Huijstee et al., 2007; Pattberg et al., 2012). These categories were 
narrowed down to best-fit governance functions observed in partnerships in the 
database. The final five categories are defined and explained in Table 4. 
Governance function Definition 
Information 
dissemination/demonstration 
Spreading awareness of climate change through campaigns, 
exhibitions and museums. Showcasing solutions through 
demonstration projects, including low-carbon cities, districts, and 
buildings.  
Rule-setting Local adoption of formal rules or regulations, including policy 
targets, regulations, and spatial plans. 
Service provision Provision of public service and public infrastructure, in the 
transport, waste management, and energy sectors. 
Technology development Development of emission reduction technology through research 
projects and establishment of low carbon research centers.  
Technology transfer Transfer of emission reduction technology that results in first-time 
adoption in the selected city.  
Table 4: Definition of governance function applied to selected climate initiatives 
To investigate if and how partnerships contribute to the introduction of new technology 
or policy approachesZHOLVWHGDQ\³QHZ´HPLVVLRn reduction technology and policy or 
planning practice. Relying on %DXHUDQG6WHXUHU¶V, p.821) study on how climate 
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partnerships contribute to policy innovation, we defined new policy as instruments not 
previously applied in a sector, region, or local authority, and changes in existing 
instruments. We adopted a similar understanding of technology, which was defined as 
new when reported for the first time in the corresponding city. To evaluate this, we 
cross-checked the database information with reports and previous research on adoption 
of clean energy in cities in China.  
4.4 Data analysis 
A descriptive analysis of the database revealed trends regarding the type of initiatives 
that emerge in different sectors and are led by different actor constellations. We used 
the database as a tool to identify the range of partnership forms, functions and types of 
actor participation that are visible in urban climate initiatives. Following this step, we 
searched for evidence of introduction of emission reduction technology or new policy 
approaches and sought to identify partnership interactions that involved either 
deliberation or inclusion of particularistic interests. We searched for evidence of 
inclusion of a broad range of social actors and various interests and debates, which 
would indicate that partnerships open up for dialogue, participation, and amelioration 
of democracy deficits (Glasbergen, 2011). We also searched for indication of biases in 
participation, for example through overrepresentation of private interests or 
manipulation by local governments, which might indicate skewed influence over 
decision-making (Backstrand, 2008; Forsyth, 2005). 
Next, we revised the database and examined emerging patterns. To find associations 
between actor constellations and specific governance trends, we created cross-
tabulations between selected variables (actor leading initiatives, collaborating partners, 
sector, governance function, and introduction of technology or policy) and tested if 
there were any correlations between variables by performing Chi-Square tests. To 
present the results, we selected examples that illustrated partnership constellations, 
functions and actor roles.  
4.5 Evaluating the results with local actors 
Ten interviews were carried out in Beijing and Shandong Province between March and 
July 2016. The respondents included government authorities, companies, academic 
institutes, industrial alliances, and NGOs. The questions aimed at finding information 
about roles of actors in partnerships and the nature and function of cross-sector 
collaboration. We also reanalyzed transcripts from ten previously completed interviews 
carried out in Beijing between January and May 2013. The earlier set of interviewees 
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included government agencies, companies, research institutes and environmental 
organizations evaluating or participating in climate mitigation dynamics on an urban 
level in China. Together they helped to evaluate the fit of our analysis to VWDNHKROGHUV¶
perceptions of climate change governance in China and clarify mechanisms suggested 
by cases in the database.  
 
5. Results 
The empirical evidence of this study suggests that partnerships are a governance 
strategy in urban climate mitigation action in China. Moreover, climate partnership 
arrangements exist in a range of forms, perform multiple functions, and support the 
introduction of new emission reduction policy and technology.  
5.1 Partnership form 
As shown in Table 5, almost half of the selected initiatives (72 out of 150) involved 
collaboration between actors. This share is similar to the frequency of partnerships 
found in research on climate initiatives in cities across the world (Castán Broto & 
Bulkeley, 2013). The result rules out the hypothesis that a dominant top-down model 
of environmental policy-making in China is preventing the formation of partnerships, 
although the political context may have a direct influence on the type of collaboration 
that emerges within this particular system.  
Partnership/No partnership Leading actor Number of initiatives 
Partnership  City 30  
 Company 36  
 Other 6  
TOTAL  72 
Single actor City 59  
 Company 17  
 Other 2 
TOTAL 78 
Table 5: Form of collaboration in selected climate initiatives 
Out of the initiatives involving multiple actors, the majority (36 initiatives) were led by 
companies. In many of these initiatives, Chinese firms imported emission reduction 
equipment from foreign companies. While some of the company-led projects involved 
limited collaboration, others involved a large number of actors and complex forms of 
interaction. In particular, this included demonstration projects, such as eco-cities and 
low carbon districts, where one or several foreign organizations (predominantly foreign 
firms, research institutes, or development banks) participated as advisors or project 
designers. 
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Of the 30 partnerships led by local governments, the most common constellation was 
partnerships with international organizations. In fact, partnerships with companies, 
local governments, or academic institutes seem to be the chief means for international 
organizations to intervene in climate governance in urban China. In total, 30% of the 
partnership initiatives involved international organizations. In the majority of these, the 
foreign partner provided technical advice, usually in low carbon demonstration or 
technology development projects. Such partnerships had the form of traditional 
development assistance projects, joint ventures (JVs), loosely structured dialogues or 
co-managed projects. Municipalities also frequently formed partnerships with 
companies. In most of these projects, technology, infrastructure or funding was 
delivered by a company to realize project implementation. These projects had the form 
of JVs, build-operate-transfer projects (BOTs), and collaborative arrangements to 
mobilize funding.  
Actors also operate independently to deliver climate action. However, this sample 
suggests that climate initiatives led by a single actor tend to reproduce known examples 
of climate action and be less innovative than partnerships. In this sample, municipal 
authorities led 59 out of 78 initiatives managed by a single actor. Many of these 
initiatives had a regulatory or administrative nature (there was a correlation between 
initiatives led by municipal authorities and measures in the land-use sector, where 
administrative strategies like zoning plans and quotas for green space are common).1 
Further, the majority of these initiatives were similar to central government policies, 
such as guidelines for enforcement of central energy efficiency targets.  
The other group of actors that often took independent climate action was companies. 
Companies independently led 17 initiatives. The majority of these projects were 
sizeable renewable energy infrastructure projects or industrial energy efficiency 
retrofits (there was a correlation between initiatives led by companies and measures in 
the waste sector, where substantial infrastructure investments were most common).2 
Nearly all independent company-led initiatives were led by large SOEs with significant 
                                                 
1
 The cRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ³LQLWLDWLYHVOHGE\PXQLFLSDODXWKRULWLHV´DQG³ODQG-XVHVHFWRU´ has a Chi-
Square coefficient of 4.7, with df = 1. This is above the critical value of 3.84 for a statistical 
significance of 0.05. 
2
 The cRUUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ³LQLWLDWLYHVOHGE\FRPSDQLHV´DQG³ZDVWHVHFWRU´ has a Chi-Square 
coefficient of 14, with df = 1. This is above the critical value of 7.9 for a statistical significance of 
0.005.  
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financial and technical capacity and ability to deliver projects without external 
collaboration.  
5.2 Partnership function 
The partnerships in this sample performed a range of governance functions, out of 
which the most common was information dissemination and demonstration (Figure 2). 
Our results are consistent with previous research that highlights information 
dissemination and knowledge sharing as important partnership functions (Pattberg et 
al., 2012; Bulkeley et al., 2012). Partnerships are often associated ZLWK ³VRIW´
governance strategies rather than formulation of binding regulation and targets, which 
is in line with the lower number of rule-setting partnerships. 
 
Figure 2: Governance function of partnerships in the selected sample 
 
Information dissemination and demonstration 
The 22 partnerships with the function of demonstration and information dissemination 
included eco-cities and low carbon districts, landscaping projects, and construction 
schemes. Eleven initiatives were led by municipal authorities, whith foreign 
organizations and/or research institutes providing advice related to technology, design, 
or planning. Most of these were eco-city projects, which in several cases were operated 
through complex ownership structures. For example, the Sino-Singaporean eco-city in 
Tianjin is managed by a joint working committee representing ministries from both 
countries, with the master planner operated as a JV formed by a Chinese and 
Singaporean consortium. Partnerships with the function of demonstration also included 
eight company-led eco-city and low carbon construction projects, where foreign firms 
and academia participated as designers, planners, or technical advisors. For example, a 
³neofuturistic´VN\VFUDSHULQ*XDQJ]KRX was designed by two foreign architect firms 
to be the most energy efficient super-tall building in the world.  
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Rule-setting  
Seven partnerships in the sample had a rule-setting function, all of which were led by 
municipal authorities. These partnerships involved formulation of emission reduction 
targets and low carbon transport plans, in which municipal authorities created obtained 
planning advice from foreign organizations, academia, and higher-level government 
institutes. For example, authorities in Qingdao developed an urban emission reduction 
plan in collaboration with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World 
Resources Institute (WRI). The ADB and WRI drew together an international research 
team that produced DQLQYHQWRU\RIWKHFLW\¶VHQHUJ\XVHDQGa technology roadmap to 
emission reductions, also reported to have improved cross-sector coordination and 
public participation. Another example is the Guangzhou Sustainable Transport Plan, 
developed by Guangzhou Municipality and the international non-profit organization 
Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP). The plan exhibits an 
integrated BRT system, railway system, and a large bike-sharing system, which is cited 
to contribute to emission reductions while being socially inclusive. 
Technology development and technology transfers 
As shown in Figure 2, the second most common functions of partnerships in this sample 
were technology transfers (16 initiatives) and technology development (16 initiatives). 
In technology transfer initiatives, Chinese companies formed linkages with foreign 
firms to import equipment for wind plants, waste-to-energy plants, co-generation 
facilities, district heating and cooling technology, and industrial energy efficiency 
upgrades. In some cases, foreign companies were actively involved in applying new 
technology and providing on-site training. Five infrastructure projects also received 
technical advice and funding from international organizations in connection with 
technology transfers. These were provided by the Asia Development Bank (ADB) (for 
a low carbon district in Qingdao) and through the CDM mechanism (four three waste-
to-energy projects and an MRT system in Guiyang).  
The sample included three forms of technology development partnerships: joint 
innovation platforms, collaborative research projects, and provision of research 
funding. An example of the former was an industrial park for recycling technology in 
the city of Qingdao, set up by an SOE and multiple academic institutes. An example of 
a collaborative research project was development of CCS technology in Chongqing, led 
by a Chinese SOE in cooperation with local academic institutes. Three partnerships 
were formed to mobilize funding for technology development. An example was a PE 
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fund for energy saving for local firms set up by Wuxi Municipality, with the 
Agricultural Bank of China and Guolian Finance Group acting as strategic investors.  
Service provision 
Eleven partnerships had the function of service or infrastructure provision. This 
included contractual arrangements (PPPs, JVs, and BOTs) between municipal 
authorities and firms, and partnerships for funding mobilization. For example, 
municipal authorities in Kunming, Baoding and Xiamen formed PPPs with SOEs in the 
provision of two solar plants and a solar-powered BRT station. Another example was a 
district heating and cooling scheme in Chongqing, which was a BOT scheme launched 
by a foreign company and financed by a loan from the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC). An example of a resource mobilizing partnership was the project 
³6KHQ]KHQ 1HZ 9HKLFOH´ in which Shenzhen Municipality introduced a financial 
leasing model to purchase electric buses with Potevio Group standing as loan guarantor. 
Shenzhen Municipality reached a similar financing agreement with Southern Power 
Group in the installation of EV charging stations. There were also partnerships between 
municipal authorities and academic institutes to design infrastructure projects. An 
example was D ³ORZ FDUERQ WUDQVSRUW KXE´ LQ 6KDQJKDL ZKHUH 6KDQJKDL 8UEDQ
Construction Design Institute were in charge of layout and design.  
5.3 Introduction of technology and policy 
Our selection of initiatives suggests that partnerships with foreign organization favor 
introduction of new solutions into local climate projects.3  In-depth study of these 
initiatives and review of interview data revealed three mechanisms through which 
partnerships with foreign actors (and to a more limited extent academic organizations) 
facilitated introduction of new policy and technology.  
The first mechanism emerged in partnerships with the function of demonstration. 
Several large-scale projects involved sharing ideas between heterogeneous 
organizations, apparently allowing for experimentation with new strategies. In this 
sample, most policy or planning approaches that were self-UHSRUWHGDV³QHZ´ occurred 
in such large-scale, multi-stakeholder demonstration projects. Examples include new 
energy efficiency building standards in Tianjin SSTEC, ecological infrastructure and 
networks of wetlands in Guangming Low Carbon District in Shenzhen, low carbon 
                                                 
3
 7KH FRUUHODWLRQ WHVW EHWZHHQ ³LQWURGXFWLRQ RI SROLF\ RU WHFKQRORJ\´ DQG ³SDUWQHUVKLS ZLWK
IRUHLJQLQWHUQDWLRQDORUJDQL]DWLRQ´KDGD&KL-Square coefficient of 12.15, with df = 2. This is above the 
critical value of 10.6 for a statistical significance of 0.005. 
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zoning codes in the Changxindian Low Carbon Community in Beijing, and man-made 
wetlands for cleanup of polluted river water in Pingdi International Low Carbon District 
in Shenzhen. A foreign consultant explained that developers and design firms often 
replicate new sustainability solutions absorbed through participation in such projects, 
creating some potential for further diffusion (Interview with international consultancy 
firm, 2016.06.13, Beijing). 
Second, new policy practices were introduced in rule-setting initiatives where 
municipal authorities sought external advice. )RUH[DPSOHWKURXJK:X[L¶VHQJDJHPHQW
in the Low Carbon Future Cities, local authorities and the German Wuppertal Institute 
created a dialogue between stakeholders in Wuxi and representatives of the city of 
Dusseldorf. This dialogue resulted in an online information system used to estimate the 
capacity of renewable energy development, which supported formulation of an urban 
emission reduction plan. Another example is Guangzhou E-core, a new planning 
strategy introduced to protect ecological areas in the Guangzhou Municipality 
formulated in collaboration between Guangzhou Urban Planning Bureau and Tongji 
University in Shanghai. The design relies on a greenway convergence logic that 
connects green areas, supports species diversification and limits use in elevated 
highways.  
Third, research partnerships may introduce new emissions reduction technologies. 
Interviews with firms in the paper and steel industries confirm that importing new 
technology helped reduce emissions over the past decade. However, imports are 
becoming less crucial as the sophistication of domestic equipment is catching up with 
Western competitors, in parallel with China shifting from an importer to a global leader 
in renewable technology (IEEFA, 2017). Several interviews highlighted partnerships 
between companies, academia, and foreign organizations as key to technology 
development (Interview with Iron and Steel Industry Alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong; 
Interview with paper industry alliance, 2016.05.22, Beijing; Interview with paper 
company, Shandong; 2016.06.13, Interview with paper group, 2016.06.18, Beijing). 
For example, a paper and pulp firm conducted research on energy conservation and 
environmental protection through partnerships with China Paper Research Institute, 
CAS, Beijing Forestry University, foreign companies and foreign universities 
(Interview with paper company, 2016.06.13, Shandong). This collaboration was seen 
as crucial for securing global leadership in clean technology.  
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5.4 Deliberation and skewed participation 
While partnerships in this sample displayed a diversity of actor constellations, we found 
that some organizations were excluded from collaborative climate mitigation efforts. In 
our selection, there were no organizations representing social agendas. While 
universities and semi-governmental research institutes were involved in multiple 
projects, these organizations participated as technical advisors rather than as advocators 
of social concerns. The only initiative led by an NGO had a technical character (design 
of a BRT system in Guangzhou). Local communities or grassroots movements did not 
lead any initiatives, and no partnerships included social justice dimensions of 
sustainability.  
The second indication of this trend was the dominance of actors that represent technical 
skill or economic resources. This trend has different explanations for partnerships with 
different functions. Partnerships for technology development creates links between 
domestic and foreign firms and research institutes. Since the objective is to develop 
technology, these networks primarily include actors that represent technical skills and 
knowledge. The image that emerges is one of close-knit networks interconnected with 
global flows of information, with actors involved in multiple, parallel collaboration 
projects. 
In rule-setting partnerships, there appeared to be somewhat more room for deliberation 
and exploration of new ideas. As mentioned above, the database contained seven 
examples of local authorities inviting foreign organizations and research institutes to 
provide new perspectives in policy making processes. While some cases involved 
references to social inclusion and public participation, information collected through 
our interviews suggest that municipal authorities favor policy collaboration with 
organizations with a ³VFLHQWLILF´ or ³WHFKQLFDO´ profile. A policy advisor explained that 
when creating sustainability and spatial plans, planning bureaus regularly ³GHOHJDWH the 
actual planning to expeUWV´ (Interview with university professor, 2013.04.19, Beijing). 
A policy maker confirms that experts often have a stong influence over local planning 
processes and that CKLQD¶V heavy emphasis on ³VFLHQWLILF policy-making´ encourages 
decision makers to seek technical advice (Interview with policy maker, 2013-03-08, 
Beijing). This tendency to favour technical policy input is likely to limit the potential 
for decision making collaboration to open up for a broad range of social interests. 
In demonstration partnerships, the evidence regarding deliberation was mixed. There 
were examples of new participatory approaches introduced through collaboration, such 
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as ³SDUWLFLSDWRU\ VLPXODWLRQ´ to integrate views of stakeholders in the Sino-Swedish 
Low Carbon Eco-City in Wuxi. On the other hand, most partners were invited to these 
partnerships to provide technical advice (research institutes and architect firms), 
funding (developers), or a combination of both (development banks). Further, the 
emphasis in low-carbon cities and districts was on technical rather than social 
innovation (Interview with policy advisor, 2013-04-18, Beijing; Interview with foreign 
consultancy firm, 2016.06.13, Beijing). Actors involved in drafting master plans for the 
eco-cities in Tianjin and Wuxi explained that local authorities and companies primarily 
were driven primarily by pursuit of technology development and profit generation 
(Interview with foreign consultant, 2013-05-24, Beijing; Interview with consultant, 
2013.05.27, Beijing). A respondent described the rationale behind the Tianjin eco-city 
as follows: 
One motive for them was to have a chance to use many new forms of technology, 
such as water technology, city district layout, and so forth. However, they were also 
interested in getting some form of economic profit from this. They wanted to sell 
real estate in the eco-city, so they wanted to increase the planning of the real estate 
area (Interview with foreign consultant, 2013-05-24, Beijing) 
The failure of ambitious sustainability projects in China to open up for social inclusion 
has been observed in previous research. For example, Caprotti (2014) describes Chinese 
eco-cities as void of social considerations, politically disengaged and catering to 
particularistic investment interests.  
In our sample of initiatives, the heavy emphasis on investment- and technology-driven 
development was most visible in company-led partnerships with the purpose of 
infrastructure delivery or demonstration, where we found no evidence of enhanced 
room for social involvement or deliberation. The sample included multiple business-
operated projects GHVFULEHGDV³ORZFDUERQ´ which exhibited only a couple of resource-
saving technologies (such as energy efficient elevators) or aimed to deliver luxury real 
estate developments. When questioned about the role of companies in low-carbon 
projects, a planner observed that their key motivation is access to market opportunities 
(Interview with research institute, 2016.05.02, Beijing). A consultant described the 
participation of developers in low-carbon projects as follows: 
IIWKH\IROORZRXUSODQQLQJDQG³JRJUHHQ´ they are likely to be able to get access 
to land more cheaply. So, they pay for the planning, and then they take the plan to 
WKHORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDQG³VD\WKLVLVJUHHQ´$QGWKLVPD\JHWWKHPWKHODQG«
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Developers in China are very practical. They mainly just want the solutions that 
save money. If we give them 24 criteria they will just take the one that are 
economically beneficial and forget the rest (Interview with international 
consultancy firm, 2016.06.13, Beijing) 
Owens and Cowell (2011) argue that a fundamental role of planning is to allow for 
scrutiny and critique, in which social and environmental objectives are taken into 
meaningful account. Such questioning works particularly poorly in the promotion of 
glamorous initiatives such as eco-towns, where sustainability tags instead are used to 
legitimize investment decisions. In China, we similarly observe that company-led 
partnerships formed with an overarching purpose of profit generation are unlikely to 
contribute to greater social inclusion and may be poorly aligned with broad socio-
environmental priorities.  
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This study shows that partnerships do emerge in this top-down political context and 
that these arrangements play an important role in climate change governance by 
facilitating multilevel interactions, horizontal collaboration and (some degree of) 
experimentation with new ideas. The study extends beyond well-known megacities to 
reveal trends in smaller urban areas and cities in locations other tKDQ&KLQD¶V(DVWFRDVW
The analysis shows that partnerships are a standard means of governance in cities with 
a robust climate mitigation discourse in China. However, further scholarly attention is 
required to understand dynamics in less-known secondary cities, rural areas and 
geographically peripheral locations (the far West, North, and South of China), which 
remain largely unknown.   
Based on the results of this research, can we explain the rise of partnerships in this 
(semi-)authoritarian political system? This study demonstrates how cross-sector 
connections facilitate the search for low carbon development solutions at the local level. 
As a collaborative advantage, partnerships create opportunities for actors to access 
resources and capacities that they do not have on their own (Glasbergen, 2007). Thus, 
partnerships allow actors to overcome barriers to action, such as limited knowledge, 
technical capacity, or economic resources. We understand partnerships in this context 
to represent a pragmatic attempt to deal with a practical problem, realized by efforts to 
access recources, best practice, and the global circulation of policies and technologies. 
In this political context, partnerships produce the additional opportunity to find 
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alternative means to govern climate change beyond top-down, state-led forms of 
governance. This is achieved through modest experimentation with new solutions and 
controlled introduction of new ideas into climate plans and projects. The diversity of 
collaborative arrangements identified by this study also suggests that climate policy 
diffusion is realized through a greater heterogeneity of channels than previously known 
(cf. Schroeder, 2008; Mai and Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). 
Does the existence of partnerships contribute to our knowledge about political change 
in China? One interpretation is that the emergence of collaborative policy arrangements 
LVSDUWRI&KLQD¶VWUDQVLWLRQWRZDUGVD³PRGHUQHQYLURQPHQWDOVWDWH´&DUWHU	0RO
2013). From this perspective, diversification of actors involved in local project and 
governance is slowly creating processes and institutions that are increasingly similar to 
WKRVH LQ WKH³:HVW´ However, taking a step back and reflecting on the evolution of 
political institutions in China cautions against this interpretation. Through in-depth 
study of decentralization experiences in China, Chung (2000) concludes that devolution 
of authority from central to local government occurs very slowly. During agricultural 
decollectivization, most local authorities chose not to use their newly granted 
autonomy, due to a long-ingrained history of centralized rule and fear of acting out of 
line. Chung (2016) has also studied decentralization by evaluating seven mechanisms 
of central control used in historical and modern times. Various control mechanisms 
have stayed surprisingly intact over centuries of rule, and many have been stepped up 
in recent years. This historical perspective suggests that while political rhetoric changes 
(for example through discourses of liberalization, privatization and modernization), 
underlying structures of power remain remarkably unchanged. In the context of 
partnerships for climate change, our research suggests that the current system of 
governance allows limited and controlled experimentation with new ideas in a system 
that overall stays the same. The rise of partnerships is unlikely to be akin to a 
development towards deliberative, bottom-up approaches to climate change policy. 
Skewed trends in participation further suggest that collaborative arrangements favor 
actors representing economic and technological capacity ± notably large domestic 
firms, research centres, international development banks, and foreign companies. 
Rather than heralding the democratization of environmental governance, climate 
partnerships may reproduce existing political practices and entrench existing structures 
of power. 
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Nevertheless, the inclusion of foreign actors LQ&KLQD¶V climate policy domain is not 
without relevance. The central government has opened up for foreign participation in 
demonstration projects, investment into infrastructure, technology development and 
technical aspects of low carbon planning. It is possible that climate change itself, as a 
particularly pressing global challenge, creates the need for collaboration. China is in a 
similar way opening up for foreign investment and collaboration in other policy 
domains that present urgent challenges and are perceived E\WKHJRYHUQPHQWDV³QRQ-
WKUHDWHQLQJ´, such as elderly care (Reuters, 2016; Suokas, 2016). Climate change is a 
powerful political discourse that can produce collaborative responses even in contexts 
least likely to open up to cooperation. These collaborative responses, however, are far 
from integrating broader societal concerns and political change that would enable a 
transformation for sustainability.  
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